IV.—" MIND-STUFF " AND REALITY by Royce, Josiah
" Mind-Stuff" and Btality. 365
for existence, which in the earlier stages of organic evolution
reigns supreme, with the commencement of social evolution
becomes steadily mitigated and transformed. It is equally true
that social evolution, which starts with the paramount ascen-
dancy of the tribal self, passes on to the liberation of the
individual self; and, having accomplished this, proceeds to
restore to the social self a final but transfigured masterdom.
But these seemingly discontinuous phases are of the accidents
of Evolution, not of its substance. The essence of Evolution is
integration, with corresponding adjustment So regarded, its
march is strictly rectilinear and continuous: and it is of this
continuous and all pervading element in it that the principle of
Efficiency is the moral counterpart and corollary.
JOHK T. PDNNETT.
IV.—"MIND-STUFF" AND SEALITT.1
PROF. CLIFFORD'S Essay " On the Nature of Things-in-Them-
selves " (MIND IX.) was one of the most ingenious of his specu-
lative efforts. No doubt, had he lived, he would have done
much to give bis thought a more satisfactory shape. But what
he did makes him one of the plainest expositors of a doctrine
that, in various forms, is now held by many among modern
thinkers. " Mind-stuff," as the word shows, is to be a substance
combining physical and psychical properties. In assuming the
existence of such a substance, we are to satisfy the demands of
philosophy both as to the explanation of external phenomena
and as to the problems of mental phenomena. The effort is,
therefore, in its nature philosophical. Whether the resulting
doctrine is tenable at all we shall see; but no one can doubt the
value for higher thought of the discussion of such questions as
Prof. Clifford in his brilliant and earnest way here suggested.
In MIND XXI., 116, Mr. F. W. Frankland has sought to give
the doctrine of Mind-stuff a more complete development.
Consistency has often been fatal to ingenious doctrines, just as
it has always been useful to thought in general; and more than
one reader must have felt his dissatisfaction with mind-stuff not
a little increased while reading Mr. Frankland's fearless state-
ment of consequences. There is something fundamentally un-
intelligible in the assertion that "motion is mind-stuff, that
1
 This article, sent from Berkeley in California, was written before the
appearance of Mr. Qumey's article on the same subject, in MIND XXIL—
ED.
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366 " Mind-Stvff" and Reality.
volume of feeling is mass, and intensity of feeling velocity "; and
even of conjectures (for Mr. Frankland throws out the assertion
merely as a conjecture) we demand intelligibility. Nor have
the brief and pointed criticisms that Mr. Shadworth Hodgson1
made upon the philosophical consequences of Prof. Clifford's
theory, as yet been answered. And Wundt, whoae statement of
a theory substantially the same as his own was cited by Prof.
Clifford, has expressly disclaimed any assumption that his view
is more than a hypothetical completion of the ordinary scien-
tific Substanzbeffrif.3 Evidently then, if this Mind-stuff theory
is to be of any permanent importance for philosophic thought, the
whole matter must be subjected to a severe critical examination.
This theory is as yet only in swaddling clothes. We have still
to decide whether the child ought to be brought up, or whether,
for the good of the state, it must be exposed on the mountains.
The doctrine is new, but the effort is indeed old, and hundreds
of volumes have been filled with attempts to prove that nature
is in some way full of souL We can judge of all such discussions
only by the use of the method of critical analysis, joined, as such
analysis must be, with a constant appeal to inner and outer
experience.
L
"The elementary feeling is a Thing-in-itself," says Clifford.
But what is the elementary feeling apart from a consciousness
into which it enters ? As we go back, answers Clifford, along
the line of the human pedigree, the organisms that we encounter
become simpler and simpler, and so, as we suppose, the com-
plexity of consciousness diminishes also. But where are we to
say that consciousness cease3 ? The continuity of the series
forbids us to say that consciousness ceases anywhere. " As the
line of ascent is unbroken, and must end at last in inorganic
1
 Philosophy of Reflection, L 174, ff. : " I am not here concerned," says
Mr. Hodgson, " with the theory of Mind-stuff. . . . My wonder is to
find any one ambitious of having Things-in-themselves as an item in his
philosophical system."
1
 Wundt's words are (Phyi. Psychol. 2te Aufl. Bd. IL, pp. 459, 460) :—
"Es verateht Bich aber von selbst dass der so erweiterte Substanzbegriff"
(that is, the concept of material substance as at the same time possessed of
psychical attributes) " ebenso hypothetisch ist wie der uraprOngliche, und
dass er uberdiesso zu sagen von bloss transitorischem Gebrauche seinkann".
Of the new as of the old notion we know that it is our own product, not a
revelation of reality. " Hier weist tiberdies schon die nicht zu umgehende
Nothigung, das Verhaltniss des Physischen zu dem Psychischen mit dem des
Aeusseren und Inneren in Parallele zu bringen, auf einen solch' transi-
torischefl^ fur das wirkliche Sein der Dinge nicht massgebenden Charakter
unserer hypothetischen Begriffe hin." For this idea of "outer and inner"
is of but figurative application here.
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matter, we have no choice but to admit that every motion of
matter is simultaneous with some ejective fact or event which
might be part of a consciousness." And so the eject-elements
exist independently and form the great world of mind-stuff,
which is itself the reality that we perceive as matter. Further-
more, we have the proportion existing: As cerebral image
(physical^ to physical object, so is perception to thing-in-itself.
Whence it follows that the thing must be of like nature with the
perception. The material universe is, therefore, an imperfect
picture in a man's mind of the real universe of mind-stuff. So
far Clifford; let us now examine the notions herein involved.
And first, one must speak of a certain vague use of terms that
disfigures many of the arguments on this whole question, and that
we must avoid in discussing Prof. Clifford's doctrine. To illus-
trate the union of physical and psychical, which this doctrine, to-
gether with other allied doctrines, seeks to prove as a fact of
nature, one sometimes sees used the figure of a "two-sided
reality ". One reads of the " two aspects," neural and psychical,
physiological and psychological, objective and subjective, of
certain phenomena. Especially, of course, are the facts of
physiological psychology thus interpreted. Mr. Lewes was a
great sinner in this respect, and Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's criti-
cism of his language1 seems to the present writer very satisfac-
tory. But Mr. Lewes was not the only sinner. Mr. Bain has
spoken2 of the one substance with two faces, which we must
study, "not confounding the persons nor dividing the substance ";
as if the language of the Athanasian Creed were just the form of
expression to throw light on a question of modern philosophy.
Wundt, notwithstanding his own above quoted reihark, has used 8
words that are open to a similar charge of vagueness, declaring
"dass was wir Seele nennen das innere Sein der namlichen Einheit
ist, die wir ausserlich als den zu ihr gehorigen Leib anschauen ".
And, in fact, such phrases are as common as they are hard to
understand. As a kind of shorthand expression for a whole
system, such a phrase may, indeed, be justified. But if one
intends it not merely as shorthand, but as the adequate formula-
tion of a philosophic truth, then we must reply that the formula
is no better than the virtus dormitiva of opium, or than the
" abhorrence of a vacuum" as an explanation of the ascent of
water in pumps. It is another case of our willingness to cheat
ourselves with words.
This criticism may seem presumptuous; but it will not be
1
 Phiiotofhy of Reflection, II. 40, ft
» Mind and Body, p. 196.
1
 Phytiologitehe Psychologit, 2te Aufl., II., 463.
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hard to justify our assertion. The point is one of the greatest
importance for all the following argument. This expression,
" one reality with two sides, or faces, or aspects," is of course a
figure. One thinks of the shield in the fable, or of a coin, or of
a mountain. These things are the prototypes of this reality.
Now what is, literally speaking, the reality in question ? A
nervous process is a coexistent, a necessary or an indispensable
coexistent of a certain mental fact, e.g., a sensation. Now this
ultimate mystery is supposed to be philosophically explained
by saying that the two facts are the inner and outer aspects of
the same reality. Is this any explanation ? We get back our
fact, plus a worn out metaphor. Are we aided ? " Inner and
outer," what is the sense of these words ? Is the sensation
inside the neural process ? " One reality " ; but what is the
one reality ? Is it the physical process ? No, that would be
materialism. Is it the sensation ? No, whoso thus believed
would be one of those subjective idealists whom nervous physio-
logy is there to refute. Is the reality then simply the sum of
the two phenomena, the fact that they coexist ? Then why
talk of a mysterious one " substance," that must not be
" divided ". " Das ist das Hexen-Einmaleins." What we mean
by material, what by mental phenomena, remains indeed a
problem for further research. But how we are brought in the
least nearer to an understanding of either problem by the
introduction of this imposing " monistic " fiction, is hard to see.
Pains we know, and motions we know, but what is this third
Unknown, whereof a group of motions is the outer, and a pain
the inner face ? The old story is repeated; here as usual in
metaphysical abstractions we find simply a new puzzle intro-
duced to solve an old one. Nerve-activities were mysterious
things, and their connexion with the mind likewise mysterious;
hence in previous generations men heard of useful " animal
spirits," which were responsible for the whole task of conveying
impressions to the mind. One fiction is now passed, but the
other cometh quickly; and the mental world is now to be glued
fast to the physical by means of a patent preparation called a
Substance. Have we never heard of Substance before in philo-
sophy that we should all run to listen to the first proclaimer of
a new one ?
But then, it will be said, the conception of the one sentient
and moving substance is after all but a brief expression for the
physical fact of the union of the two sets of phenomena. No
harm can come from a mere figure, from a fiction of language.
No harm to be sure, we reply, if one is conscious of the fiction
when one uses the words. But most seem to be unconscious of
the fiction, and yet are highly pleased with the words. Not
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merely to sum up scientific facts, but dogmatically to make
insignificant assertions stand in place of facts, is the language
that we. have criticised often used. When Schopenhauer
declared the Will to be " die Causalitat von innen gesehen," he
imagined that he had stated a very profound truth; and his
" insight" was employed to make all natural laws the expression
of WilL We may or may not accept his theory; but we shall
not admit that the clever metaphor had anything to do with
the proof thereof.
But still it may be maintained that we all distinguish mental
and physical facts, that we commonly, and without fear of
confusion, call them respectively internal and external facts,
and that speaking of them as phenomena of one substance or
reality is of use in pointing out their causal connexion. But
in fact, as we must answer, this theory of the double-faced
substance is founded on the denial of the existence of causal
sequence between the physical phenomena on the one hand and
the accompanying feeling on the other. This theory is framed
especially to lay stress on the fact that physical phenomena as
such cause physical, mental as such cause mental phenomena,
or that at the utmost mental phenomena affect the physical,
but not the reverse. The theory wishes to express the fact of
the necessary coexistence of the two groups of phenomena, as
distinguished from any influx that might be supposed to take
place from the world of matter into the correlate world of con-
sciousness. This fact, however, is, as we have seen, best
expressed without any use of the terms of this ambiguous and
dangerous theory.
The theory of Mind-stuff has therefore no magic to change
one whit the nature of the problems of matter and mind.
These problems may be better stated by the theory, but they
cannot thereby be solved. For prove to us that the connexion
between mental and physical phenomena extends throughout
the whole universe, and that every motion of every atom is
accompanied by some rudimentary psychical event; still you
have not in the least altered our philosophical theory of things,
nor thrown any light on the nature of the union of the two sets of
phenomena. To say, "every atom is possessed of a little fragment
of mind-stuff," tells us nothing about the nature either of the
atom or of the mind-stuff. To say, " but the atom is the mind-
stuff," or " what outwardly exhibits itself as a material atom
inwardly shows itself as an elementary mind-atom "—this is to
use the above condemned artifice of veiling a problem under a
form of words. The what that thus is two entirely distinct
things at once, is an indefinable and incomprehensible product
of misused languaga There is, by hypothesis a mental, and
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there is also a physical fact These are coexistent, and neces-
sarily so. Tho Mind-stuff theory tells us nothing new about
the facts or about their correspondence. It lumps together two
sets of facts, and calls the aggregate by a new name.
IL
Yet perhaps it may be objected that the Mind-stuff theory
does not so much assert the existence of an unknown something
behind the two distinct seta of phenomena, as the actual
identity of so-called physical phenomena with mental pheno-
mena. An adherent of the doctrine in question might state
his case thus :—" No mere artifice of language is intended. The
theory means simply this, that there are, properly speaking, no
real material phenomena at all. There are only mental pheno-
mena, more or less complex. One does not speak of any
substance apart from the phenomena. One means only that all
real facts are ' ejective ' facts. Just as we admit that there are
minds behind certain material phenomena, ijt., behind the
voluntary motions of men and of higher animals, so the theory
wants us to admit mental facts as the ultimate explanations of
all material phenomena."
This statement seems more plausible than the last. I have
thoughts and express these in word or in act My neighbour's
thoughts are affected by mine, but not by the direct knowledge
of what is in my mind. To my neighbour my thought is known
only through its physical expression. This is to him the
phenomenon, of •which the ejective truth is my mental state.
So then with the atom. Its little fragment of mental life is
expressed to the little fragment of mental life next it, to its
neighbour atom, in the form of such a modification as collision
or as attraction. But impenetrability is not the fundamental
property of the atom. Impenetrability is only the atom's way
of showing its own little mind, just as my way of showing my
thought is by outward resistance to aggression, or by some other
bodily act.
But then, if we are to be thus thorough-going, and to admit
none but mental facts as ultimately real, can we explain the
phenomena of the physical universe ? Not, as will be seen, on
the assumptions made by the Mind-stuff theory. That all
existence is for consciousness the present writer fully believes.
But this philosophical doctrine is not identical with the Mind-
stuff hypothesis. For the believer in mind-stuff, existence and
consciousness are by. no means coincident. Mind-stuff, in its
ultimate fragments, is wholly destitute of the complication the
unity and the activity that constitute conscious existence. The
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" Mind-Stuff" and Rvdiiy. 371
mind-stuff atom is of psychical nature, but unconscious; it is
not, like Hartmann's Unconscious, already intelligent, but it is
not necessarily even a part of a consciousness. Therefore in
arguing against this anomalous product of modern ingenuity one
is not arguing against Idealism or Phenomenism as properly
understood. Mental facts are the ultimate reality; but not
auch mental facts as these of the Mind-stuff theory.
But let us examine the consequences of the theory. There
ire no realities except fragments of mind-stuff. These are
joined in complex masses to form minds; or again are more-
amply combined to produce inorganic phenomena. All grades
•f complexity exist, from the elementary bodies up to man's
train. Together these bits of mind-stuff are responsible for the
vhole world of phenomena.
But pausa What is left of the world of phenomena ? There
ire only fragments of mind-stuff, and these are ultimate and
limple. We must think them after the analogy of our own-
simplest mental states, via., of our sensations. They are far
simpler than even these, and, no doubt, far less intense; but
they are analogous. What follows ?
First, there is no real space remaining. Space-relations are
unreal and illusive. For if there are only sensations, or ultimate
simple psychical phenomena analogous in nature to our simplest •
sensations, only fainter and simpler, then there is no possible
meaning in saying that there is any space. There are no doubt
in many of our simpler states of consciousness, in all the data
of at least two of our developed senses, space-elements constantly
present But in these cases there is existent a complex con-
sciousness. Space-knowledge is a part of this complex, incon-
ceivable without it. Ultimate mind-elements, conceived after
the analogy of our simplest sensations, have a time-element, and
an intensity as well as a quality. But of a space-element in
each, and of space-relations such as distance and direction
among these elements, who shall venture to speak ? What
meaning would there be in Euclid's axioms if the world were
composed wholly of elementary sensations not grouped into
conscious minds ? Are pains in themselves above or below
other pains ? Is an emotion of love or of hate distant an inch
or a mile from other emotions ? When I listen to a tragedy or
read a treatise on metaphysics, are my thoughts in spatial
relations to one another ? And even when sensations are for us
grouped into wholes in space, as the sensations of touch that
come to me from this table are grouped, do we properly say
that the elementary sensations apart from the consciousness that
groups them are already in space ? We shall be certain then
that at least some mind-stuff is non-spatial. And where then
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372 " Mind-Stuff" and Reality.
shall we stop ? Plainly space-relations will belong not. to the
noumenal mind-stuff atoms, butvto the fashion of perceiving
determined by the nature of consciousness. I then perceive the
noD-spatial mind-stuff, and perceiving give it the space-form ?
But I, too, am a mass of mind-stuff And this brings us to
the second consequence of the doctrine. One mass of mind-
stuff perceives other masses. Or again, since the law of inter-
action is supposed to apply to inorganic physical phenomena a*
well as to the higher phenomena, every atom of mind-stuff
affects other atoms. But how is this conceivable? When 1
perceive a mountain, there is an alteration in the mind-stuf
of which I consist New stuff is added, or old is removed, o:
the disposition of what is present is changed. But how ? The
ultimate fact for my consciousness is: The mass of mind-stuff
that constitutes me is altered. How can this change be effected
by any change in other mind-stuff? The answer of course wil
be: The alteration of one fragment or mass of mind-stuff througt
the action of another fragment or mass is an ultimate and
mysterious fact, whose laws are to be studied, but whose reason
is unknown. But still one asks, in what way is the change to
be conceived ? And the answer is not easy. Suppose, first,
that the ultimate atoms of mind-stuff are absolutely unchange-
able in nature, and incapable of destruction or of increase
in number. So to think these atoms, would be to use the
analogy of the more rigid atomic theories of the physical world.
Assuming this view for a moment, let us consider the result
The mind-stuff atoms cannot be destroyed or created or changed
in nature. Hence only their grouping can be altered. Some
change, rhythmic or otherwise, in the grouping of the mind-stuff
atoms in the thing I see, produces an alteration in the grouping
of the mind-stuff atoms in me, or perhaps takes from or adds
to my stock of mind-stuff atoms. The result is that change in
me which is called a perception of the object But how or in
what sense is a new grouping of mind-stuff atoms conceivable ?
A change of grouping is conceivable if the things grouped are
outside of one another in space. Their direction and distance
may be altered in an infinite number of ways. But here is the
mind-stuff atom a, and the other atom b. These atoms are, it
is to be remembered, mental facts and nothing more. They are
" ejects ". How can these change their relation to one another,
i.e., their grouping ? The groups ab and ba could be formed,
a might be conceived above or below b, distant an inch or a
league from b, or what else you will, so long as a and b were
things in space. But a and b are here not things in space.
What can distance or precedence or above or below mean, when
applied to relations between two independent mental facts ?
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A very easy question, some one may reply. If to any con-
sciousness a first is present and then b, a very different total
impression may be made from the impression produced by the
appearance first of b and then of a. Pour water into a pre-
viously-prepared glass, and the result is easily distinguished
from the result of first pouring the water and then preparing
the glass. No doubt; but see the admission thus made. Given
the consciousness in which a and b are grouped, given the one
reflective judge, before which a and b appear, and then the
grouping in time of a and b may be important But that deve-
loped consciousness is, for the Mind-stuff theory, not yet deduced.
Here is a complex of mind-atoms. What can be meant by any
grouping of them whatsoever, and & fortiori what can be meant
by that complex grouping known as a consciousness ? This is
the very question at issue. Each mind-atom for itself exists
in time, and so, if you choose, co-exists with all the others.
Thus there is a grand aggregation of alL But where is any
union into groups ? Where is any meaning for the words
" alteration of grouping " ? How is, then, any law conceivable
by which one group is connected with any other ? How can a
change of one group affect any other ?
It is plain all this talk about the grouping of mind-atoms is
nothing but a barren figure of speech. We are used to space-
relations, and to laws connecting one group of material particles
with other groups. Now, however, for the sake of solving
certain problems, we have determined to assume once for all
that in reality there exist, not material particles, but ultimate
feelings or mind-atoms, fragments that might be joined into a
complete consciousness, but that may exist apart therefrom.
Now, when from these atoms we try once more to build our
world, we are debarred from using the ideas derived solely from
the experience of matter and of space. These mind-atoms are
not hard and mobile, they are not at various distances from one
another, one is neither above nor below another, nor in any
other like relation. Such words applied to mental phenomena
are simply nonsense. Our first problem is this: to find ways of
conceiving how these ultimate mind-atoms may be so related
among themselves as to produce and explain the phenomena
observed in the appearances of material things. Our answer to
the problem is thus far wanting. And wanting, we affirm, the
answer must remain. For the only groupings of such ultimate
unchangeable mental facte conceivable to us are groupings in
and for a consciousness. Without a consciousness mere sensa-
tions can never be definitely grouped. Given a " looking before
and after," a comparing, discerning activity, a reflection, and
then different groupings of mental facts may be conceived.
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Even then, however, the grouping would imply something
besides a mere dead co-existence of ultimate atoms of min i
The grouping would imply attention, and so change of inten-
sity, reproduction, temporary or total destruction of the mind-
elements concerned; and all this, if you suppose only ultimate
co-existent atoms, is not conceivable.
But one may change ground and say that the mind-atoms are
not wholly unchangeable. In fact, if one does not do this, it is
indeed hard to see how even such a material phenomenon as
the collision of two atoms is to be interpreted into the language
of mind-stuff. For physics there is nothing inconceivable in
the phenomena of collision, granted only the conceivability of
matter and of motion. But for the Mind-stuff doctrine the
case is different What motion may mean, or what, if " motion
is mind-stuff," the matter over and above the motion may mean;
what a bit of mind-stuff may experience when its velocity
changes, when its direction of motion changes, when another
bit of mind-stuff is in its path (think of the " path " of a sen-
sation) ;—all these questions, puzzling enough in themselves,
would be in all seeming absolutely beyond solution, if one may
not assume some continual alteration in intensity or in quality
in the ultimate mind-atom itself. Suppose, then, that the world
consists of fragments of mind-stuff whereof each one is endowed
with a capacity for the change, within certain limits, of its own
intensity and quality. Suppose, also, that by some pre-estab-
lished harmony (other source is hardly well conceivable) the
alterations in one atom are uniformly connected with alterations
in other mind-atoms, according to fixed laws. Then, indeed,
the world of mechanism, of dead matter and motion, could be
in a manner conceived. That is, one could understand how to
each simple phenomenal mechanical effect, e.g., a blow or a push,
there corresponded some noumenal alteration in the mind-stuff
atoms. Even the law of the conservation of energy would be
capable of expression in terms of such assumed elements.
Since velocity and mass would be interpreted in terms of ulti-
mate alterations or permanences in the mind-atoms, all laws
about velocity and mass could be expressed in the same terms.
But consciousness? Here we pause, not a little doubtful. Is
consciousness a mere aggregation of atoms of feeling ?
All consciousness is a synthesis of many elements into unity.
The consciousness of the pails of a rose or of a house exists
more or less vaguely in my mind. In saying, " This is a rose "
or " a house," I actively combine these parts into a wholo that
is more than their sum. The parts are, as parts, mutually
indifferent. Add to the present sensations any number of faint
revivals of past sensations, and you have still only an aggregate of
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disjointed discontinuous elements, until in the " unity of apper-
ception," continuity and wholeness shall be granted to the aggre-
gate. If a, b, c, d, e, &c, are separate and really distinct ele-
mentary feelings, say of colour, I see not wherein shall consist
their continuity as mere elements. How out of them shall there
arise in me the perception of a continuous coloured surface?
Physiological psychology can here be of no aid. That science
supposes consciousness and outside reality as ultimate realities,
and seeks to determine the relation of sensations, simple and
complex, to. external reality, to nerve-processes, and to conscious-
ness, and in like manner to determine the relations of conscious-
ness to external reality and to the accompanying nerve-processes.
In no wise does this science undertake to deduce consciousness
from what is not conscious, any more than it seeks to make
external reality appear a product of mind. But the Mind-stuff
theory seeks to build up consciousness, with all its activity, out
of unconscious elements. The theory can only succeed in case
consciousness can by any possibility be shown to be an aggregate
of elements in themselves unconscious. Can this be done ?
Our aggregate of colour sensations, is that the perception of a
coloured surface ? Add to the aggregate any number of associa-
tions with past sensations of movement or of touch: have you
yet the idea of a coloured surface ? No, make the associations
as complex as you will, they remain side by side, indifferent to
one another, a discrete manifold of materials for consciousness,
but not yet a consciousness. But in conscious life we do not
find discrete manifolds of sensation that simply come and are
passively received. Sensations are always grouped into wholes,
and the wholes are known by and in " acts of unity ". " This is
a rose," I can say. " This is a complex of colour sensations with
associations of movement, touch, and smell," I can also upon re-
flection say; but then, too, I have grouped facts of consciousness
into a new unity: I have not succeeded in getting an aggregate
of separate sensation-elements. And so consciousness is always
more than a sum of sensation-elements ; while, given a sum of
sensation-elements, there is no way of seeing how by themselves
alone they can ever become a consciousness.
In nature it often happens that a manifold of distinct parts
results in an unity that is not a mere sum. So every organ-
ism, so even every chemical compound, exhibits properties
qualitatively different from the properties of the constituent
parts. But how are these properties of the compound manifested ?
Only in the behaviour of the manifold towards the world external
to itself. In itself a mass of parts, the whole behaves as one
when it comes into relation with other tiling. The compound
molecule is a sum of atoms. But in its behaviour as a molecule
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towards other molecules it shows new qualities, aud so is more
than a mere aggregate. The organism is an aggregate of tissues.
But in its behaviour in the presence of the outer world it showB
adaptation and an integration of parts, so that we call it one, not
a mere aggregate. A mere combination is, when regarded solely
in and for itself, never an organised whole. Aggregations are
organised wholes only when they behave as such in the presence
of other things. A statue is an aggregation of particles of marble;
but as such it has no unity. For the spectator it is one; in and
for itself it is an aggregate : just as, to the consciousness of an
ant crawling over it, it may again appear a mere aggregate. No
summing up of parts can make an unity of a mass of discrete
constituents, unless this unity exist for some other subject, not
for the thing itself.
But consciousness is, in and for itself, an unity, containing a
multiplicity of parts, but not wholly made by the summation of
these parts. Now, given a sum of mind-atoms, how shall con-
sciousness arise out of them ? This complex is to be one.
How ? In its behaviour towards the external world ? Then it
would seem one to a higher intelligence, contemplating its
behaviour, not to itself. In its symmetry or perfection of
structure ? Here again only another being, contemplating its
perfections, would regard it as one. In and for itself then ?
But how ? The elements a, I, c, d, e, &c., are in some mysterious
way together, not in space (for they are feelings), nor in another
mind (for they themselves are to constitute the whole of some
individual mind), but somehow together. And they form in
and of themselves but a single consciousness. To this end, is a
the one element that appercdves all the rest ? Is a then the
one unity ? Then a is the consciousness in question, and not a
mere elementary sensation; while I, c, d, are superfluous or at
least accidental constituents. But are all of them the unity ?
This is impossible ; for by hypothesis these elements are in and
of themselves many. There is then no unity, no consciousness
possible. And let no one answering say: When I look into my
consciousness I find nothing there but an aggregate of impres-
sions arranged in certain forms. No doubt that is all you find
—besides that which you have chosen to call " I " and the act
of " looking". Apart from the unity of the consciousness of
any moment there is doubtless nothing but multiplicity. But
this unity itself, what of that ?
The present writer does not wish to seem unduly fond of
entities of any sort. This " self-consciousness," this " unity,"
these " forms " in which impressions are arranged, no doubt all
of them need further analysis and explanation. No doubt it is
overhasty to make them the ground for assuming any spiritual
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entity, any soul-substance or absolute self or other figment as
their cause or substratum. Metaphysicians have doubtless
abused these facts of consciousness; but the facts are none the
less there. And the present essay wishes to point out that, be
the explanation of the facts what you will, the Mind-stuff
doctrine fails to give a possible explanation.
Our objections to the hypothesis of Prof. Clifford are then:
First, that if the theory is understood as offering the current
" monistic " explanation of the connexion between physical and
psychical facts, viz., the explanation that these facts show
different sides of one reality, theu the theory is merely a sort of
scholasticism revived, and substitutes a dead word for a living
problem. Secondly, that if by the theory is meant that physical
things are nothing but aggregates of ultimate simple mental
realities, these realities or feelings, if conceived as unalterable,
fail to explain anything and, even if conceived as changing in
particular fashions, still fail to explain consciousness. Thirdly,
that, since all changes of grouping, of distance, of direction, are
excluded from the world of reality by the hypothesis in ques-
tion, all change will be change in the interior of the individual
mind-atom, and that thus the theory is committed to a method
of regarding the world which will at best involve us in enormous
difficulties as soon as we try to explain actual phenomena.
The importance of the questions involved has detained us
longer over this theory than some may think necessary. And
in truth mere refutation is unprofitable except as preparing the
way for positive results, results either already in our grasp or
still to be sought. The present writer is confident that a theory
can be suggested as a solution of tliis problem, a theory that
shall be at once idealistic and critical, just to the facts of con-
sciousness and adequate to the demands of the philosophy of
nature. Such a theory, if formulated, will not deal in entities
nor in substances, spiritual or material, but will simply and
accurately state what we mean and imply when we assert the
distinction and the connexion of physical and psychical pheno-
mena. To the statement and proof of such a theory, the writer
hopes to devote his efforts in a future paper. At present he is
content with formulating a purely negative result.
JOSIAH EOYCE.
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